Chapter 5: Aliens are the Enemy

Foreigners and other Minorities are fundamentally “other” and a threat to the UK

In 2014, an electrifying exchange unfolded between Nigel Farage, the then leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and James O’Brien, a renowned interviewer celebrated for his incisive questioning. The atmosphere in the London radio studio crackled with tension as the discussion evolved.

O’Brien pressed Farage about his previously expressed discomfort with hearing foreign languages on a train journey and daringly mentioned Farage’s German wife, questioning whether he felt the same unease when she spoke German — a direct reference to his comments about the train journey. Farage, with an air of dismissal, retorted, “I don’t suppose she speaks it on the train,” a deflective response that drew disdain from listeners. Farage could not explain why hearing German spoken in his home was fine, yet foreign languages on a train made him uneasy.

The conversation took a sharper turn as O’Brien probed Farage’s claim of feeling similarly uncomfortable if a group of Romanians moved in next door. He pressed Farage to clarify whether he would feel the same about a group of German children and questioned, “what’s the difference?” Farage responsed, “I think you know the difference. We want an immigration policy that is not just based on controlling, not just quantity, but quality.” This comment left much unsaid about what he considered made Germans of superior quality to Romanians.

The interview proved disastrous for Farage, who struggled to account for his party’s association with far-right terrorism supporters, the overt racism and homophobia displayed by his party’s candidates, his alleged use of the N-word, his use of derogatory terms for Chinese people, and his own ties to far-right British National Party activists. The interview abruptly concluded when Farage’s communications director burst into the studio to halt the proceedings.

This live radio confrontation went beyond a heated exchange; it reflected the simmering issues of racism and xenophobia that would come to define the tone of the Brexit referendum and the post-Brexit policies of the British conservative movement.

Racism and xenophobia are intricate social phenomena that have significantly influenced the United Kingdom, a nation steeped in a history of empire, cultural assimilation, and conflict. To grasp the intricate nuances of these attitudes, we must examine not only their historical roots but also the psychological mechanisms that sustain them. This chapter embarks on an exploration of the multifaceted origins of racism and xenophobia within the UK. Our journey encompasses the nation’s colonial history, its relationships among its own members (past and present), and the transformative shifts in its demographic landscape following post-war immigration.

Simultaneously, we will examine the underlying psychological frameworks that underpin these prejudices, such as social identity theory, the process of ‘othering,’ and cognitive biases like stereotyping. In doing so, we endeavour to offer a nuanced perspective that intertwines history with psychology, social policy with individual behaviour, and collective narratives with personal experiences.

While racism and xenophobia manifest differently in various cultural contexts, their presence in the UK holds particular significance. The British Empire, once spanning continents, propagated ideologies that fostered racial hierarchies and rationalized the subjugation of indigenous populations. The remnants of these ideologies did not merely dissipate but continued to permeate British society, shaping not only how the English viewed distant colonies but also their closest neighbours.

In addition to historical events like colonialism, early xenophobic episodes such as the ‘Evil May Day’ riots, and discrimination associated with immigration waves like the Windrush Generation, we must also consider the internal dynamics of discrimination within the British Isles. This includes the historically complex relationships with Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, where cultural, linguistic, and ethnic factors have been employed for ‘othering’ and exclusion.

By weaving together these diverse threads, this chapter seeks to provide a holistic perspective on the origins and perpetuation of racism and xenophobia in the UK. Through this exploration, we aim to illuminate the deeply embedded systems and psychologies that contribute to these phenomena. Only by understanding these complexities can we hope to unravel the enduring challenges of discrimination and, understand why so much of British policy is based on the idea that 'Aliens are the enemy'.

Racism Defined and Redefined

During the interview we referenced earlier, Farage and O'Brien engaged in an exchange that shed light on the complex nature of racism and its interconnected components.

"What is racism? Is racism between races?" Farage inquired, seemingly seeking to dissect the essence of racism. In response, O'Brien challenged Farage's line of questioning with a poignant query of his own: "Don't you know? How can you say you're not something if you don't know what it is?" Farage continued his supposed quest for clarity, asking, "Is race about colour? Is race about race? Is it about nationality?"

This exchange showcased Farage's attempt to reframe the discussion and create ambiguity around the definition of racism. By questioning whether racism pertains to colour, race, or nationality, he appeared to be employing rhetorical tactics to distance himself from the label of racism. If racism is not defined, or is defined narrowly, then people only experience racism when it is carried out by a self-professed racist who acknowledges racism as their motivation. O'Brien's response, however, emphasized the importance of understanding the concept of racism before disassociating from it. He implied that one cannot disavow a label without an understanding of its implications.

In essence, this dialogue underscored the intricate and intertwined nature of discrimination. It highlighted how various factors, including race, colour, and nationality often overlap and intersect, contributing to the multifaceted experience of prejudice and bias.

Both racism and xenophobia function as ideologies, representing sets of beliefs that construct a hierarchical organisation of human worth. While racism often focuses on perceived biological differences, xenophobia is generally concerned with cultural, national, linguistic or religious differences. Both sets of beliefs have historically underpinned the establishment of social, economic, and political systems that perpetuate inequality.

In the UK, colonial ideologies justified not only the racial but also the cultural and national subjugation of indigenous peoples globally, leaving an enduring impact on British society and contributing to its fragmentation.

An example of racism as an ideology is White Nationalism, an ideology of racial superiority, where one race, the "white" race, is deemed superior to others. Similarly, White Nationalism typically elevates a particular nationality above all others. White Nationalists tend to prefer policies that promote racial segregation, limit immigration to preserve a perceived white majority, prioritise the interests and culture of white people above others, and adopt isolationist international policies to minimise foreign influences. Unsurprisingly, ideologies like White Nationalism have been responsible for many atrocities.

Today, relatively few British people claim to adhere to racist and xenophobic ideologies, however this, unfortunately, does not mean that racism and xenophobia are not common in the UK.

Racist prejudices manifest as attitudes, which can be either conscious or unconscious. While explicit forms of racism are straightforward to identify, unconscious cognitive biases are more insidious, affecting interactions and decisions in subtle ways. Cognitive biases are not only restricted to race but also extend to nationality, religion, and culture, subtly validating exclusionary practices and divisive politics within Britain.

An example, of racist and xenophobic attitudes can be found in the discrimination against job applicants with 'foreign-sounding' names. While some racists might deliberately discriminate against such applicants, it is more common for employers to unconsciously favour candidates with names that sound more familiar or "native," even if they have the same qualifications as 'foreign-sounding' job seekers. A preference for the familiar, and a discomfort with the unfamiliar combine to create discrimination.

Prejudice can also be structural and systematic. Structural racism and xenophobia are deeply embedded in the systems and institutions that govern society, manifesting in policies and practices that, while seemingly neutral, disproportionately disadvantage minority communities. Laws, regulations, and procedures often make it more difficult for immigrants to access services or secure jobs. For instance, an employer might insist on a British driving licence, even though a French driving licence is valid in the UK, or a professional regulatory body might refuse to recognise qualifications from foreign institutions, even if those institutions adhere to the same standards. Additionally, landlords might refuse to rent to immigrants because of additional reporting requirements mandated by the government regarding the right to residency.

Bureaucratic requirements for proving residency or accessing services may seem impartial but often disproportionately affect people of colour due to historical circumstances. These requirements might be more easily met by immigrants from wealthy, white, European countries with well-developed administrative systems than by those from poorer, post-colonial countries with weaker systems. Similarly, cultural practices of immigrants from white countries might mean that white immigrants do not encounter difficulties complying with hair and dress codes in schools and workplaces, whereas immigrants from non-white, non-Christian countries might struggle to comply with such rules. For example, school dress codes around hairstyles and headwear might be easier for white Christian girls to comply with than for Black or Muslim girls.

These instances of structural and systemic discrimination persist even when individuals within these systems sincerely believe they are free from prejudice. The very architecture of our policies—crafted with supposed neutrality—unwittingly fortifies existing disparities. If there were similar systematic issues affecting socially valued groups, these barriers would be removed, but the 'minority' status of those affected breeds a collective apathy towards remedying the situation. Thus, systemic discrimination endures through institutional inertia and a glaring absence of safeguards against discrimination, perpetually marginalising specific groups. Be it in employment, housing, or education, these prejudices manifest in insidious ways, reinforcing societal divides.

Finally, both racism and xenophobia are lived experiences. For those on the receiving end, these are not mere abstractions but psychological realities affecting daily life. This lived experience encompasses overt discrimination, microaggressions, and subtler forms of social exclusion. It also includes the fear and anxiety that come from being perceived as 'alien,' whether based on skin colour, cultural background, or national origin. For example, a minority applicant preparing for an interview may fear being rejected or derogated because of past experiences of racism in similar contexts. Even if they do not encounter explicit discrimination during the interview, the stress and anxiety remain, making the experience more difficult. Acknowledging these experiences is essential for a rounded understanding of the harmful ideologies that continue to fracture British society.

From these descriptions, it is clear that racism, xenophobia, and related phenomena are complex and multi-faceted. However, in the UK's public discourse, there is a tendency to discuss these forms of discrimination within the framework of the 'bad apple' theory. This framework recognises an act as racist only when committed by an obvious racist or xenophobe. When discrimination and oppression result from unconscious attitudes or institutional procedures, these experiences are often dismissed as inconsequential or simply unfortunate.

For bigots, the complex nature of racism and xenophobia offers a treasure trove of socially acceptable disguises for prejudice. Calls for immigration reduction become a convenient veil for white nationalism, cloaked in the guise of pragmatic economic concerns. The urge to punish minorities is artfully masked behind the seemingly noble rhetoric of 'promoting integration'. Efforts to dismantle structural barriers to discrimination are deftly thwarted by campaigns ostensibly aimed at 'preserving heritage'. These manipulations are not merely subtle; they are insidiously effective, allowing bigotry to thrive under the respectable cover of legitimate discourse.

Intersections of Prejudice: Journalists, Politicians and Think Tanks

In the UK, the synergy between political ideologies and media narratives significantly shapes public opinion and societal attitudes, especially concerning issues of racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia. The UK's entanglements with colonialism and imperialism have left indelible marks on its political and media discourse. As a result, many people struggle to identify supremacist and imperialist rhetoric when they hear it.

In recent years, the British media has been critiqued for its portrayal of immigrants, Muslims, and other minority groups, fostering a climate of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and other forms of prejudice. Tabloids like The Sun and the Daily Mail have been notorious for headlines inciting fear and mistrust towards immigrants and Muslims. For instance, The Sun's 2015 headline "1 in 5 Brit Muslims' sympathy for Jihadis" was heavily criticised for misrepresenting survey data and promoting a narrative portraying Muslims as a threat to national security.

A study by the Muslim Council of Britain revealed that nearly 60% of British news articles covering Muslims portrayed Islam negatively, with one in five associating the faith with terrorism or extremism. Similarly, The Centre for Media Monitoring analysed around 48,000 articles and over 5,500 broadcast clips between October 2018 and September 2019. Their findings revealed biased reporting and support for anti-Muslim policies, especially in right-leaning British newspapers. The content often showcased a 'Clash of Civilizations' narrative, attributing crimes and extremism to Islamic religious motivation, and falsely portraying Muslims as inherently anti-Semitic. This was exacerbated by verbatim reporting of false religious claims made by terrorists about Islam.

The media's emphasis on racial and national backgrounds in criminal activities is one way in which it cultivates and promotes prejudice. This has been observed to trickle down to policing practices and the criminal justice system. For example, London’s knife crime problem is frequently framed as a ‘black problem.’ As a result, police have adopted ‘stop and search’tactics that disproportionately target young black men. However, when Glasgow had the highest rates of knife crime, and most victims and perpetrators were white, the problem was not framed as a ‘white problem’ by the media and police did not disproportionately target young white men.

This pattern continues when we look at the example of Gypsies, Roma, and Travellers, often framed as synonymous or associated with crime and degeneracy in the British media. A report funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust analysed trends in the British media where over a span of three years, 365 stories were published, primarily in the Daily Mail and Daily Express, focusing on GRT communities. Most of these stories were centred around allegations of crime by GRT individuals and issues surrounding GRT campsites, indicating a potential tabloid campaign to over-represent and misrepresent these communities.

Journalists, who contributed anonymously to the report, noted that "Stuff about Gypsies sells in terms of the amount of clicks you get and the amount of advertising revenue you can get off the back of it" and that "Prejudice is a business model." These contributions confirm that many in the media know that their practices take advantage of fears about minorities and, worse still, contribute to the cultivation of bigotry.

Similarly, the constant bombardment of immigration-related stories has helped keep the issue at the forefront of public discourse. This constant media focus often presents immigration as a pressing problem, thus shaping public opinion and framing immigration as a subject of concern. Furthermore, the language and framing used by the media have often portrayed migrants in a negative light. One study found that the most common term used in relation to "migrants" in popular British newspapers was "illegal," a framing that not only criminalises migrants but also creates a sense of threat among the public.

Misrepresentation of immigration levels further exacerbates public anxiety. A significant misperception observed among British citizens is the overestimation of immigration levels, with individuals, on average, believing that 31% of the UK population were immigrants, while the actual figure was 13%. This overestimation, fuelled by media narratives, creates a distorted image of immigration levels, which in turn stirs anxiety and fear among the public.

Even refugees, once a sympathetic group, are not safe. The sensationalist reporting surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis, epitomised in headlines like "Migrants: How many more can we take?" from the Daily Express, underscored a narrative of invasion and burden. Such negative framing significantly shapes public opinion and policy debates, often narrowing the discourse to prejudiced narratives.

British politicians have a long tradition of promoting racist and prejudiced narratives towards minority groups, For example. Winston Churchill reportedly endorsed the slogan "Keep England White" in 1955. Prominent subsequent examples of this tradition include Enoch Powell's "Rivers of Blood" speech in 1968, the Smethwick Election slogan in 1964 ("If you want a bleep for a neighbour, vote Labour"), and Margaret Thatcher's support for apartheid South Africa.

Allegations of Islamophobia against senior Conservative politicians like Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, and Zac Goldsmith highlight the ongoing issue. Johnson's 2004 novel "Seventy-Two Virgins" was criticised for racist language and stereotypes. Notably, the novel also depicted Jews as controlling the media, further fuelling anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. However, such behaviour proved no barrier to his campaign to become leader of the Tory party.

The Brexit campaign further spotlights the popularity of anti-immigration sentiments. Nigel Farage launched the "Breaking Point" poster showing a stream of non-white migrants walking through the countryside with the slogan "Breaking Point," and the text "the EU has failed us all. We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders." This poster appealed to those who shared the views of former BNP MEP Nick Griffin, who stated, "I want to help stop the immigration which is destroying this and every other white nation in the world. Then I want to see that deadly tide turned." Griffin's worldview was seemingly shared by Sammy Wilson of the Democratic Unionist Party, who was filmed agreeing with a man wanting to "get the ethnics out" during a BBC programme in 2016.

The relationship between prejudiced media coverage and bigoted political policies is symbiotic. Negative media coverage fosters a cycle of stereotyping, igniting discriminatory tendencies, and cultivating an adversarial atmosphere. Politicians respond to the resulting concerns and validate media narratives by promising to address the imagined and exaggerated problems posed by minority groups. Such plans and promises provide newspapers and broadcasters with additional fodder for sensationalist headlines about minority groups,

Media figures sometimes attempt to excuse their behaviour by claiming that they are merely representing public opinion. This is not the case. A study published in the British Journal of Political Science explored the relationship between media coverage and public support for UKIP, a party defined by anti-immigration rhetoric and policies. The study found evidence supporting the notion that media coverage drives party support rather than the other way around. During certain periods, stagnating or declining support for UKIP was followed by increases in media coverage, which then led to subsequent increases in public support for the party. This dynamic suggests that media coverage may drive public support for anti-immigrant parties in a powerful way.

In addition to the media's portrayal, the role of clandestinely funded think tanks, particularly those housed on Tufton Street like Migration Watch UK, further exacerbates the misrepresentation of migrants and other minorities. These entities are notorious for generating questionable research about immigration and frequently participating in media debates where they often spread misinformation.

The overarching objective of the Tufton Street network of think tanks is to galvanise support for the Conservative Party while steering that party towards policies endorsed by their clandestine benefactors. This network adeptly exploits xenophobia, racism, and other societal prejudices as instruments to achieve their political ends. By conjuring a narrative of threat and disquiet around immigration and minority groups, these think tanks not only reinforce misleading stereotypes but also contribute to a broader conservative agenda. Their covert funding and the dissemination of dubious research serve to inflame existing prejudices, perpetuating a vicious cycle of misinformation that underpins and perpetuates discriminatory policies and public attitudes.

The insidious alliance between certain media outlets, politicians and these shadily funded think tanks cultivates a fertile ground for the propagation of prejudiced, xenophobic and racist narratives, which in turn serve the interests of those lurking behind the curtain of anonymity. Prejudice, it would seem, is not only a business model, but a very successful business model for those willing to promote it.

From Prejudice to Policy: The Windrush Case Study

The Windrush scandal starkly illustrates how prejudiced attitudes can morph into unjust policies, significantly impacting lives. The term ‘Windrush Generation’ refers to immigrants from Caribbean countries invited to the UK between 1948 and 1971 to address labour shortages post-World War II. The name “Windrush” originates from the ship HMT Empire Windrush, which brought one of the initial groups of West Indian immigrants to the UK in 1948. Despite their legal status, many of these individuals, along with other long-term Commonwealth residents, were wrongfully detained, denied legal rights, threatened with deportation, and, in at least 83 cases, wrongfully deported by the Home Office. These individuals had been residing legally in the UK for decades but lacked documentation, which was not initially required upon their arrival.

Over time, the political narrative around immigration soured, due to sensationalist headlines, the political maneuvering of figures like Nigel Farage and consequent public anxiety. Under then-Home Secretary Theresa May, the Home Office adopted the ‘Hostile Environment Policy’ in 2012, aiming to make staying in the UK arduous for those lacking documentation. This policy, underpinned by anti-immigrant ideology, created a narrative of suspicion and disdain towards immigrants, facilitating unjust policies.

The Hostile Environment Policy was designed to deter illegal immigration by making life difficult for undocumented individuals, but its effects extended beyond its intended targets, causing distress among legal residents, particularly the Windrush generation. Measures included requiring landlords, employers, banks, and healthcare providers to verify immigration statuses, creating a pervasive culture of checks throughout society to deny services to those without proper documentation. This policy aligned with the Conservative Party’s pledge to reduce net migration and played into growing anti-immigrant sentiment.

Albert Thompson (not his real name), a cancer patient, exemplifies the policy's human toll. Thompson, who arrived in the UK from Jamaica as a teenager in 1973, had been living legally in the UK for 44 years before being told in 2017 to pay £54,000 upfront for cancer treatment due to insufficient documentation. This was not because Thompson had entered the country improperly or had failed to meet legal requirements. The Home Office had simply set the documentation requirements above those required for the Windrush generation to legally reside and work in the UK. His story highlighted the injustices faced by the Windrush generation, who were denied healthcare, lost jobs, faced eviction, and saw their lives shattered. The mental, emotional, and financial toll on those affected was immense.

The scandal tarnished the UK’s image, exposing systemic flaws in its immigration policy and treatment of immigrants. It sparked a nationwide debate on institutional racism and the human cost of stringent immigration controls. The Windrush scandal underscores the corrosive power of prejudice in policy-making. The anti-immigrant ideology that gripped the Home Office, exacerbated under Theresa May’s tenure, resulted in policies causing immense suffering and injustice. It serves as a stark reminder of the need for fairness, justice, and human rights in immigration policies and the dire consequences when these principles are ignored.

Historical Echoes: The Recurring Themes of Racism in the UK

Apologists for anti-immigrant sentiment in the UK often try to excuse racist and xenophobic attitudes by claiming they are natural reactions to high levels of immigration from culturally and religiously distinct regions, arguing that assimilation is impossible. This framing shifts the blame for racism and xenophobia onto the immigrants themselves, rather than acknowledging them as victims.

However, this argument can be rebutted by examining the recurring nature of racist attitudes in the UK, revealing how similar prejudices have been directed at various groups throughout history. By exploring historical attitudes and providing examples, we can understand the continuity of these biases and their manifestation in modern times.

One remarkable aspect of racism in the UK is the recurring use of similar stereotypes against different groups at different times. For instance, during the 18th and 19th centuries, anti-Welsh racism surged in response to Welsh migration to England. A popular rhyme of the time, “Taffy was a Welshman,” exemplifies this sentiment:

Taffy was a Welshman, Taffy was a thief; Taffy came to my house and stole a leg of beef; I went to Taffy’s house, Taffy was in bed; I took the leg of meat and hit him on the head.

In this rhyme, Taffy, symbolizing the Welsh immigrant, is depicted as a thief and a cheat, with no good intentions attributed to him. Although one must exercise caution in over-analysing nursery rhymes, the rhyme’s undertone of violence towards the portrayed dangerous immigrant resonates with today’s hostile attitudes towards migrants crossing the English Channel to claim asylum.

This recurrence of prejudice isn’t confined to the Welsh. Examining the 1792 print “Sawney Wetherbeaten” published by William Holland, reveals a similar disparaging portrayal of Scots. The most common depictions of Sawney are found in contemporary satirical prints. In “Sawney Wetherbeaten”, Sawney is depicted as tall and scrawny, with long hair, a long nose, bulging eyes, and a scowling face. He is clothed mainly in tartan plaid, but his legs and feet are left bare, implying a sense of poverty. This portrayal emphasises the stereotypes of Scots as poor, backward, and alien during that period.

The notion of racial differentiation within the British Isles was not uncommon prior to the mid 20^th century. A notable figure who espoused such ideas was Robert Knox, a respected anatomist and ethnologist whose 1850 writings illustrate the racialised differentiation of the people of the British isles that was common during this period. He wrote:

“The really momentous question for England, as a nation, is the presence of three sections of the Celtic race still on her soil: the Caledonian, or Gael; the Cymbri, or Welsh; and the Irish, or Erse; and how to dispose of them…”

“…The Caledonian Celt touches the end of his career; they are reduced to about one hundred and fifty thousand; the Welsh Celts are not troublesome, but might easily become so; the Irish Celt is the most to be dreaded…”

Knox advocated for the forced removal of these Celtic races from the soil of the British Isles, a viewpoint that while not dominant, was not unusual in his era. His work starkly showcases the racialised attitudes prevalent during that period, emphasising a divisive narrative that portrayed the Celtic races as inherently different and threatening.

Indeed, Modern British ‘gingerism’ has roots in historical anti-Celtic bias and prejudice, as red hair is a trait commonly associated with Celtic descent. The historical tensions and conflicts between England and its Celtic neighbours, notably Ireland and Scotland, fostered stereotypes and biases that have endured over centuries. While contemporarily, ‘gingerism’ is viewed as relatively harmless when compared to other more severe forms of prejudice, its persistence reminds us of how racist attitudes persist even after the ideologies that birthed them have been rejected.

These examples illustrate how arbitrary the concept of the 'other' can be. Today, many white Anglo-Saxon English people embrace a British identity and celebrate their kinship with their Celtic cousins. This is not because they see Welsh and Scottish people as identical to the English, but because they perceive the differences as benign or insignificant. However, despite historical evidence disproving the notion that 'aliens' cannot 'assimilate,' this idea continually resurfaces, targeting new groups each time.

Irish Immigrants in Britain: The Precursor to Contemporary Racism and Xenophobia

The experience of Irish immigrants in Britain offers a profound illustration of how sectarianism, xenophobia, and racism often intertwine, serving as a pretext for demonising and marginalising minority groups.

Ireland’s union with the United Kingdom from 1801 until 1922, was a period marked by hardships. In Britain, stereotypes painted Irishmen as lazy, stupid, disloyal, superstitious, and violent. British politicians viewed Ireland as a resource to be exploited, with its people needing control.

The population of Ireland plummeted from about 8 million to 4 million under British rule. The Famine (1845–1851) claimed 1 million lives, while many others immigrated, including to Great Britain, in search of better prospects. Once in Britain, Irish immigrants, especially Irish Catholic immigrants, faced significant discrimination and exploitation.

With the dawn of the 20th century, the prejudice against Irish Catholics had already taken root in Britain. However, the post-Irish War of Independence era, coupled with the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, altered the dynamics of this hostility. The Free State’s inception technically marked Irish immigrants as foreigners on British soil, although the close economic and historical ties between Britain and Ireland complicated the matter. Particularly, the crucial role of Irish labour in the British economy made the idea of restricting Irish immigration unattractive. Even though the Irish Free State was no longer part of the UK, its status within the British Empire and the UK citizenship of many Irish immigrants added layers of complexity.

The British government’s laissez-faire stance on Irish immigration was a pragmatic response to a complex issue. However, this stance did little to pacify the growing nativist sentiments among some factions in Britain. This era was a testing ground for the resilience and adaptability of the Irish immigrant community amidst continuous hostility and a rapidly changing socio-political landscape.

This period not only showcased sectarian and xenophobic currents but also reflected the racial prejudice deeply ingrained against the Irish. It highlighted a complex drama of religious bigotry intertwined with xenophobia and racial discrimination in a rapidly evolving socio-political scenario. To further understand this dynamic, we will delve into three separate incidents across England and Scotland, illuminating the plight of the Catholic Irish Free-State immigrants in 1930’s Britain.

In Glasgow, the early 20th century saw a significant population of Irish diaspora, especially in Glasgow and its surrounding areas. By 1901, first-generation Irish immigrants in Scotland numbered 207,000 within a national populace of 4.5 million. Glasgow’s Irish community had roots dating back to the 1790s. Predominantly Catholic, these immigrants were often stereotyped and seen as outsiders due to their religious practices, language, cultural norms, and political ideologies. They were relegated to the bottom rungs of the labour hierarchy, scorned as burdens on the Poor Law, and blamed for societal woes, from criminality to disease.

This sentiment gained traction with the publication of a derogatory pamphlet titled “The Menace of the Irish Race to Our Scottish Nationality” by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1923. It accused the Catholic Irish of stealing jobs and participating in a papist conspiracy aimed at undermining Protestant values. This narrative fueled a vigorous campaign by the Scottish Church into the 1930s, urging the British power corridors to halt immigration from the Irish Free State and repatriate Irish natives residing in Scottish prisons or drawing poor relief.

Political factions with anti-Catholic agendas in Edinburgh and Glasgow saw a rise in support during local elections, reflecting the prevalent xenophobic ethos. The Church’s fervent campaign for employment discrimination urged Scottish employers to favour workers “of the Scottish race,” a rallying cry that persisted past World War II.

In Lancashire, disdain towards the Irish reverberated notably in 1933 when Major Danne delivered a sermon titled “England at a Crossroads,” blending economic concerns with paranoid diatribes against societal degradation. Danne accused Irish immigrants of causing unemployment and other social ills, falsely claiming an “invasion” of 3 million Irish workers since 1915. Had these grossly exaggerated claims been true, the island of Ireland would have been virtually uninhabited during the period.

Liverpool, with its long-standing Irish community dating back to the early 19th century, was a microcosm of sectarian and xenophobic discord. This cauldron of tension boiled over with the influx of new Irish immigrants, who were accused of merely seeking the city’s unemployment benefits and welfare.

In 1931, The Liverpool Review published an article decrying the impact of Irish immigrants, stating that there was “abundant evidence … that a very grave injury is being done to the prosperity of Merseyside and to its population”. Similarly, by 1938, the Liverpool Daily Press began using the term “infiltration” to describe the presence of the Irish community in Liverpool.

The simmering resentment organized into a formal endeavor with the inception of the Irish Immigration Investigation Bureau in January 1939, following an anti-Irish protest meeting that drew a crowd of over a thousand angered individuals. The bureau, a brainchild of conservative councillor David Rowan, became a factory of misinformation, churning out spurious claims designed to stoke fear and mistrust among the populace.

A notable accusation by the bureau revolved around the alleged employment of Irish workers in the construction of an aircraft factory on Liverpool’s outskirts. The narrative, as spun by Rowan and his cohorts, claimed that the Irish workforce abandoned their posts in Autumn of 1938 amidst the looming threat of World War II during the Czechoslovak crisis, only to return once the imminent threat of war dissipated, allegedly displacing the English workers who had filled the void. However, reality bore no resemblance to these claims, as both McAlpine’s, the building contractor, and local labour exchange data refuted these allegations, affirming that a staggering 95% of the workforce hailed from Liverpool itself.

Undeterred by facts, the bureau continued its campaign of falsehoods, resorting to concocting unverifiable rumours. A nefarious narrative they peddled was that an Irish worker would only hold a job until qualifying for unemployment benefits, after which they would summon a relative from Ireland to take over, while they lived off the dole. The vitriol escalated in the late 30s when the IRA initiated a bombing campaign in Britain, prompting Mary Agnes Cela, a Liverpool politician affiliated with the Irish Immigration Investigation Bureau, to issue a chilling warning that Liverpool would “rise and clear out the Irish” should the bombings persist.

Across Glasgow, Lancashire, and Liverpool, the discrimination faced by Irish immigrants manifested in different yet interconnected ways. In Glasgow, political and religious institutions perpetuated a narrative of racial and cultural inferiority, urging policies of repatriation and employment discrimination. In Lancashire, bogus immigration figures were weaponised by public figures to blame Irish immigrants for unemployment. In Liverpool, politicians and journalists spread misinformation about Irish immigrants in order to stoke public fear and justify discriminatory policies.

The disdain directed at Irish immigrants unveils a complex fabric of biases that continue to permeate contemporary society, albeit targeting different groups. The anti-Catholic rhetoric of the past resonates with today’s Islamophobia, while assertions of racial inferiority echo modern white supremacist ideologies. Conspiracy theories suggesting immigration being orchestrated by hidden hands are reminiscent of contemporary anti-Semitic narratives. The depiction of the Irish immigrant embodies a paradox reminiscent of Schrödinger’s immigrant — believed to be in the UK to both seize employment opportunities and exploit the benefits system.

Moreover, the Irish were branded as agents of crime and disorder, with looming fears of them replacing the native British populace if their influx was not curtailed. Their alleged inability to assimilate was ascribed to their distinct religious, cultural, and racial identities.

The media played a pivotal role, frequently emphasizing the nationality of Irish offenders, shaping a narrative that seemingly swayed the actions of police and judiciary towards such individuals. The ensuing moral panic dovetailed into a drama triangle, casting Irish individuals predominantly as villains — criminal, immoral, violent, and intrusive — depicted as the crux of societal woes. In these narratives, the native British citizen emerged as the victim, portrayed as threatened or displaced, while the hero materialized in the form of authorities, whether police or politicians, striving to reinstate order in the community. This narrative framework bears a striking similarity to the current media depiction of the Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller Community.

Misinformation acted as a formidable instrument to hyperbolise immigration levels, engendering a climate of fear and hostility. The intertwined narratives of racism, sectarianism, economic apprehensions, and xenophobia collectively fueled a moral panic around Irish identity, engendering a hostile atmosphere that seeped into diverse societal interactions.

These parallels demonstrate the versatility of the other 'othering playbook'. Identical arguments and strategies are used against different groups over time, always with the intent to instil fear. This fear fuels outrage, boosts newspaper sales, and advances political careers. While specific forms of racism, religious bigotry, and xenophobia have unique features, the psychological mechanisms used to support prejudiced policies remain constant.

Through a historical perspective, it becomes clear that societal dynamics which fostered hostility towards the Irish during the early 20th century are part of a broader, recurring pattern of bigotry and discrimination that continues to this day.

Introduction to Psychological Prejudice

Understanding the resilience of the 'othering playbook' in promoting racist, sectarian and xenophobic ideologies requires learning about the psychology behind racism and prejudice. Exploring how we categorise people uncovers the roots of these ideologies, fostering a deeper understanding of discrimination.

Famed psychologist Gordon Allport’s theory of prejudice emphasises categorisation as a natural tendency to group entities, including people, based on shared attributes. Categorisation simplifies our complex reality but also paves the way for overgeneralisations and misperceptions. Allport introduced the term stereotyping to refer to rigid, often oversimplified ideas about groups, typically fuelled by a lack of personal interaction with the stereotyped individuals, subsequently promoting prejudicial attitudes. Allport argued that Ethnocentrism, the belief in one's group's superiority and disdain for other groups, nurtures in-group cohesion at the expense of hostility towards out-groups, hindering appreciation for cultural diversity and fostering prejudicial attitudes.

Practical Exploration: Jane Elliott’s Classroom “Experiment”

Jane Elliott’s classroom “experiments” provide a tangible exploration into the mechanics of prejudice and discrimination. The venture began when a young student, Steven Armstrong, inquired about the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., leading Elliott to pivot the day’s lesson towards understanding racial discrimination. Elliott, believing that simply discussing racism would not help her students understand it, proposed a simulation to embody discrimination and her students enthusiastically supported the proposal.

Elliot told her class that they would be segregated on the basis of eye colour. She initially declared that brown-eyed children superior. At first, the children expressed scepticism, so Elliott created a fake rationale for the distinction, a link between melanin, which determined eye colour, and intellectual prowess. As this misinformation seeded, the classroom dynamic drastically altered. The "superior" brown-eyed children evolved into condescending figures, exhibiting arrogance while their academic performance soared. Conversely, the "inferior" blue-eyed children turned timid and submissive, their academic achievements plummeting, and their social interactions characterised by isolation, even among previously dominant characters.

The most alarming aspect of this experiment was the rapid adoption of arbitrary categorisation by the children, leading to negative stereotyping and discriminatory behaviour. In the subsequent role reversal, where Elliot informed the class that her initial claim was a mistake and that blue-eyed children were actually superior, the blue-eyed children mirrored the demeaning behaviour previously exhibited by the brown-eyed group, albeit with lesser intensity.

Jane Elliott's experiment illuminated the ease with which individuals, even children, can be rapidly indoctrinated into prejudicial attitudes. It emphasised the profound effect such categorisations can have on personal and group dynamics, academic performance, and social interactions. The swift transformation observed in the children illustrates the powerful impact of categorisation, stereotyping, and group dynamics outlined in Allport's theories, highlighting our susceptibility to prejudice when authority figures tell us that some people are better than others.

Minimal Group Paradigm Research

While often called an “experiment”, the Jane Elliot classroom case study does not demonstrate the rigor associated with traditional psychology experiments. The quest for a more scientifically grounded understanding of prejudice and intergroup relations heralded the emergence of the Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP). Developed in the 1970s by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues, MGP sought to distil the essence of group identity and intergroup behaviour to its most basic form. By creating arbitrary groups based on trivial criteria, such as preferences for certain paintings or the flip of a coin, MGP aimed to observe the bare minimum conditions required for individuals to exhibit in-group favouritism.

The core premise is that participants (adults and children alike) are randomly divided into groups. They are then tasked with awarding rewards, prizes, or even money to other participants through specially designed booklets. The recipients remain anonymous, identified only by a number and their group affiliation (e.g., Member 3 Group A; Member #, Group B).

Early research illustrated that even when groups were formed using completely arbitrary criteria (e.g., a coin toss), participants exhibited in-group bias. This effect remained intact even when participants were made aware that the groupings were meaningless. Researchers concluded that merely the existence of an out-group was sufficient for social comparison: Individuals compare their groups to others, striving to maintain a positive social identity by favouring the in-group and possibly derogating the out-group, leading to in-group bias.

Studies employing the Minimal Group Paradigm suggest that in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination can manifest even in the absence of actual conflict or competition between groups. Theorists posit that by elevating the status of the in-group while downgrading the out-group, individuals can enhance their self-esteem and social identity.

Numerous studies have revealed that participants act favourably towards members of their own in-group, often foregoing rewards for themselves to widen the gap in rewards between the in-group and out-group members. For example, in experiments where participants could distribute points to their own group and the out-group, they tended to allocate more rewards to their own group, even if it resulted in lesser rewards for themselves.

In-group favouritism provides a basis for cooperation and community. However, it heavily distorts perceptions of out-groups. People tend to perceive out-group members as less trustworthy. For example, a study was conducted to understand how past interactions with trustworthy or untrustworthy individuals would affect children’s judgments when grouped together based on simplistic labels.

In the study, children watched a video featuring two individuals, one from their group and the other from an outside group, naming common items. One individual named the items correctly, while the other didn’t. When later asked whom they’d trust to name an unknown item, children usually chose the previously correct individual. However, if the correct individual was labelled as an outsider and the incorrect one as part of their group, children no longer favoured the correct individual. This study showcased that being labelled as an outsider could override demonstrations of trustworthiness.

In addition to in-group bias, social categorisation also leads to out-group homogeneity perception, where there’s a belief that “they” are all similar. Individuals within a group tend to see those outside the group as more alike than those within. In a study in the US involving students from rival universities, Princeton and Rutgers, participants were shown a video of three young men making a decision, for example choosing between rock or classical music, and were told the man was from either Princeton or Rutgers. Participants had to predict the man’s choice, and after the choice was revealed, estimate how many male students at the same institution would choose similarly. Results showed that when the man was from the out-group, participants believed his choice was more indicative of what his peers would choose, showcasing a tendency to generalise and underestimate diversity in out-groups.

During challenging times, individuals are more likely to scapegoat out-group members, as illustrated in a University of Alabama study. Participants were asked to administer electric shocks to a confederate who either insulted or befriended them. Black confederates who insulted participants, received stronger shocks than white confederates who engaged in similar insulting behaviour. Conversely, friendly behaviour resulted in milder shocks to black confederates than to white confederates, showcasing how while outgroup members may be tolerated when times are good, they may be treated harshly under stressful circumstances.

The results of such studies may lead you to believe that in-group favouritism and out-group derogation are automatic and apply equally across all circumstances. However, this is not the case. Negative stereotyping and associated behaviours are most likely to occur in certain circumstances. Racist, xenophobic and sectarian stereotypes can impact judgments even without personal endorsement of such stereotypes. All that is required is an environmental trigger for the relevant stereotype. 

Consider the example of a research study where participants watched a nuclear energy debate between an African American debater and a white debater. Before rating the debaters, participants experienced one of three scenarios: a racist remark, a non-racist remark, or no remark about the African American debater by a confederate. The findings revealed that a racist remark significantly lowered the rating of the African American debater compared to the other scenarios, illustrating how a single racist comment can trigger negative stereotype activation, affecting the judgments made about the African American debater’s performance.

Manufacturing Prejudice and Countering Discrimination

The British media and right-wing political factions manufacture and amplify fears around immigration and religious or ethnic differences, creating menacing narratives that align with Allport's theories on overgeneralisations and misperceptions. These depictions of minorities as alien and threatening activate cognitive biases, making people more susceptible to supremacist ideologies.

The Brexit campaign, for instance, capitalised on fears around immigration, using categorisation and stereotyping to depict immigrants as threats. Political figures, think tanks and media commentators came together to activate negative stereotypes about minorities. This fostered in-group favouritism towards native Britons and animosity towards immigrants. Through inflammatory rhetoric and sensationalised narratives, they created a fertile ground for xenophobic and sectarian ideologies to flourish, presenting themselves and their endorsed policies as solutions to contrived or exaggerated crises.

For victims of prejudice, it is difficult to dispel the dangerous myths promoted by the media. Once framed as 'other,' they are no longer trusted. The constant stream of derogatory depictions by politicians and media figures means their arguments are perceived less favourably due to activated negative stereotypes. However, this does not mean that prejudice cannot be counteracted.

Allport believed that interpersonal contact could effectively reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members, provided four critical conditions are met: equal group status within the contact situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities, law, or custom. Meeting these conditions can promote understanding and reduce prejudice between different social or ethnic groups. Politicians and policymakers can bridge divides by promoting policies that encourage intergroup contact under favourable conditions, such as funding community centres where diverse groups can interact and cooperate towards common goals.

Subsequent research has expanded on Allport's framework, identifying additional factors that enhance the positive impact of intergroup contact. Mutual interdependence between groups, where each group needs the other to accomplish common goals, fosters positive relations. Organisations like trade unions can encourage harmony by uniting workers from different backgrounds in common causes. Informal interpersonal contact that allows for personal acquaintance and friendship formation can significantly reduce prejudice.

The effectiveness of contact is further enhanced when individuals have multiple contacts with different members of the out-group, preventing the perception that a positive experience with a single out-group member is exceptional. Social norms promoting equality and discouraging discrimination are crucial for the success of contact interventions.

Journalists can also contribute by exercising caution in how they portray minority groups, immigrants, or different religions. Avoiding the activation of negative stereotypes and providing balanced views can challenge existing prejudices and contribute to a more accurate public understanding. Journalists should not mention the race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion of a minority group member when reporting on them if they would not do so for a member of a majority group.

These conditions highlight the necessity of a conducive environment for contact to mitigate prejudice effectively. When favourable conditions are met, contact can promote mutual respect, understanding, and friendship, significantly diminishing prejudice and discriminatory attitudes. However, if these conditions are not met, contact alone may not be sufficient and could exacerbate existing tensions. Genuine representation and inclusion require more than empty words and gestures.

The Mainstreaming of the Far-Right Threat

The insidious infiltration of far-right ideologies into the mainstream political arena often hinges on the skill of charismatic figures, like Nigel Farage, who manage to veil extremist rhetoric under a cloak of palatable nationalism and patriotism. Returning to his 2014 interview, James O’Brien’s probing of Farage’s past interactions with notorious far-right personalities such as Tony “the bomber” Lecomber and Mark Deavin. Both men were affiliated with the British National Party. Farage’s association with these men shines a spotlight on the murky divide between UKIP and the far more overtly fascist BNP. The photo O’Brien referenced, depicting Farage in camaraderie with these dubious figures, underscores the minimal differences between overt white nationalism and the socially acceptable ‘nationalism’ espoused by figures like Farage

The BNP, known for its ultra-nationalist, racialist, and authoritarian ideologies, represents a clear-cut case of far-right extremism. Tony “the bomber” Lecomber is a criminal who served a three-year jail term for possessing explosives and another three-year sentence for stabbing a Jewish schoolteacher. Lecomber was once an electoral campaign manager for former BNP leader and MEP, Nick Griffin. Mark Deavin, on the other hand, is a known purveyor of anti-Semitic rhetoric, authoring disturbingly racist literature like “The Grand Plan: The Origins of Non-White Immigration” and editing “Mindbenders,” an expose of Jews in the media.

When confronted about his association with these BNP figures, Farage unconvincingly responded, “I wanted to find out what on earth had made somebody change their point of view.” Farage claimed that his party would “… not sit with people who we believe to be on the extremes; we will sit with people who we believe to have a reasonable balanced point of view.” This response would, perhaps, have been more reassuring had Farage not spent the subsequent years forming alliances with a variety of far-right figures across Europe.

As we delve deeper into the phenomenon of far-right mainstreaming, the Farage-O’Brien interview, and its lack of repercussions, serve as a stark illustration of how extremist ideologies, when rebranded with a veneer of moderation, can significantly threaten liberal democracies and social harmony. Farage adeptly transformed far-right politics into centre-right politics, and Britain followed suit. Despite O’Brien's efforts to expose Farage’s bigotry, by 2014, the UK media had already begun to accept such views as a normal part of the political conversation - no more notable than fiddled expense claims or a broken electoral pledge.

The first steps towards the mainstreaming of the far-right started during the 2000s with the BNP under the leadership of Nick Griffin. In 2002, a significant breakthrough came when they won three seats in the Burnley borough council elections, marking their entrance into local politics. They continued on this trajectory, gaining council seats in subsequent local elections and achieving a total of over 50 seats across England by 2009. In addition to their success in local elections, the BNP also made headway in the London Assembly Election in 2008. Richard Barnbrook was elected as an assembly member, which was seen as a significant achievement for the party.

One of the BNP’s most notable successes came in the 2009 European Parliament elections. During this election, Nick Griffin and Andrew Brons were elected as Members of the European Parliament for the North West England and Yorkshire and the Humber regions respectively. This historic win marked their first representation at a national or supranational level.

This period also saw a substantial amount of media attention directed towards the BNP. Although the media coverage was mostly negative, it nonetheless raised the party’s profile and membership numbers. A notable moment of media attention occurred in 2009, when Nick Griffin made a controversial appearance on BBC’s Question Time, providing the party with a prime-time platform and presenting it as equivalent in stature to non-extremist parties.

These successes were short-lived, and the BNP began to decline after the late 2000s due to internal disputes, financial difficulties, and the rise of other right-wing parties and groups. Its ideological offshoots include both proscribed and legal organisation such as Blood & Honour the British Movement, the British People’s Party, Combat 18, the National Front, the National Socialist Movement, the Racial Volunteer Force, Pirate 28, National Action, Britain First and the English Defence League.

The threat posed by extreme right-wing terrorism (ERWT) has been on a steady rise over the last two decades. Predominantly, this form of terrorism finds its recruits among older and younger white males and teenagers. Recently, the Head of MI5, Ken McCallum, acknowledged the growing menace of extreme right-wing terrorism. Although he emphasised that Islamist terrorism still represents a larger threat, he expressed concerns over the escalating attempts within far-right circles to acquire firearms — whether through illegal means, homemade, or 3D-printed.

McCallum pointed out a concerning trend where the threat is evolving from structured, real-world groups like National Action, to a more dispersed online menace. He underscored the role of global “right-wing extremist influencers” in disseminating conspiracy theories and fueling grievances, which in turn, promotes ‘lone wolf’ attacks.

A few harrowing instances of ERWT attacks include the 2022 firebombing of a Dover migrant centre by Andrew Leak, the 2019 stabbing of a Bulgarian teenager by white supremacist Vincent Fuller, the 2018 torching of Exeter Synagogue by Tristan Morgan, the 2017 attack on Muslims exiting a mosque in Finsbury Park by Darren Osborne, and the 2016 murder of Jo Cox MP by Thomas McNair. Significantly, in 2021, nearly 41% of all counter-terrorism arrests were associated with ERWT.

One of the alarming facets of ERWT attacks is the initial radicalisation pathway is often rooted in mainstream right-wing media. Articles and videos from right-wing and centre-right outlets tend to perpetuate negative stereotypes of minority groups such as Muslims and immigrants. Engaging with such media, individuals often find themselves driven by a sense of threat, which is further fuelled by algorithm-driven suggestions from “alt-right” outlets. While much of this content finds a home on mainstream and social media platforms, far-right entities frequently channel users towards more extremist material found on closed platforms like WhatsApp groups and Telegram Channels. Membership in these closed groups exposes individuals to a more radical narrative and conspiracy theories, which in turn, provides the impetus for self-initiated terrorist attacks against perceived adversaries.

However, the BNP’s lasting contribution to the UK is not the proliferation of fascist online content, but its success in pushing certain issues such as immigration and national identity, into mainstream political discourse. As the party suffered as a result of internal disputes and financial difficulties, UKIP stole a large chunk of their voters. Speaking in 2014, Nigel Farage said that he was “proud” that UKIP had claimed a third of all BNP voters. Former Tory MP and UKIP deputy chairman Neil Hamilton followed this up by stating that former BNP voters who felt “swamped” by immigrants were turning to UKIP as a “decent” alternative to the BNP.

However, UKIP also experienced a similar rise and fall to the BNP. The party’s first significant electoral success came in the 2004 European Parliament elections, where they secured 12 seats, marking their emergence as a notable force in UK politics. This success was further amplified in the 2009 European Parliament elections, where UKIP came second only to the Conservative Party in terms of vote share, securing 13 seats.

The party’s influence continued to grow, and in the 2014 European Parliament elections, UKIP made a remarkable breakthrough by topping the polls in the UK and securing 24 seats. This victory marked the first time in over a century that a party other than the Labour or Conservative parties won a nationwide election.

In addition to European electoral success, UKIP also made strides in local elections. In the 2013 local elections, they secured 147 council seats across England and saw a significant increase in their vote share. They continued this trend in the subsequent 2014 local elections, winning over 160 seats.

In the 2015 General Election, UKIP garnered nearly 4 million votes, translating to 12.6% of the total, although this resulted in only one seat in the House of Commons due to the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, the substantial vote share indicated a level of support that was hard to ignore. The pinnacle of UKIP’s success arguably came with the 2016 EU Referendum, which saw a majority of British voters opting to leave the European Union. This was a monumental victory for UKIP, as their primary political objective was achieved.

However, the BNP's lasting contribution to UK politics is not the proliferation of fascist online content, but its success in pushing certain issues such as immigration and national identity, into mainstream political discourse. As the party suffered as a result of internal disputes and financial difficulties, UKIP stole a large chunk of their voters. Speaking in 2014, Nigel Farage said that he was "proud" that UKIP had claimed a third of all BNP voters. Former Tory MP and UKIP deputy chairman Neil Hamilton followed this up by stating that former BNP voters who felt "swamped" by immigrants were turning to UKIP as a "decent" alternative to the BNP.

However, UKIP also experienced a similar rise and fall to the BNP. The party's first significant electoral success came in the 2004 European Parliament elections, where they secured 12 seats, marking their emergence as a notable force in UK politics. This success was further amplified in the 2009 European Parliament elections, where UKIP came second only to the Conservative Party in terms of vote share, securing 13 seats.

The party's influence continued to grow, and in the 2014 European Parliament elections, UKIP made a remarkable breakthrough by topping the polls in the UK and securing 24 seats. This victory marked the first time in over a century that a party other than the Labour or Conservative parties won a nationwide election.

In addition to European electoral success, UKIP also made strides in local elections. In the 2013 local elections, they secured 147 council seats across England and saw a significant increase in their vote share. They continued this trend in the subsequent 2014 local elections, winning over 160 seats.

In the 2015 General Election, UKIP garnered nearly 4 million votes, translating to 12.6% of the total, although this resulted in only one seat in the House of Commons due to the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, the substantial vote share indicated a level of support that was hard to ignore. The pinnacle of UKIP's success arguably came with the 2016 EU Referendum, which saw a majority of British voters opting to leave the European Union. This was a monumental victory for UKIP, as their primary political objective was achieved.

However, post-referendum, UKIP began to face a series of challenges. The achievement of their main goal led to a loss of purpose for the party, and internal divisions began to emerge. Nigel Farage resigned as party leader shortly after the referendum, and what followed was a period of instability with frequent changes in leadership. Farage launched a new party, the Brexit Party (now Reform UK), which further eroded UKIP's support base.

Electoral successes became elusive, with dismal performances in subsequent elections, including losing all of their European Parliament seats in 2019. By the early 2020s, UKIP had considerably faded from the political landscape, with much of its support base and key figures having moved on to either the Reform or Tory parties.

No political party in Britain feared and hated UKIP and the BNP more than the Tory Party. Since the 2000's, they had found themselves losing seats to Labour candidates as traditional Tory voters switched their votes to the BNP or UKIP because they felt that the Tories were not nationalist enough and were too soft on immigration.

The hardline stance of the BNP in 2001, calling for an immediate halt to non-white immigration, seemed outlandish at the time. Their approach contrasted with the Conservative’s approach of reforming the asylum system to ensure that it remained a safe haven for the genuinely oppressed, proposing secure reception centres for new asylum applicants. Yet, by 2017, the political narrative had shifted considerably. The Conservative Party, among others, had adopted a tougher stance on immigration, aligning more closely with BNP's 2005 agenda of stringent immigration control and Nigel Farage's preferred approach of focusing on "quality". By 2023, the Tories' flagship policy was to stop asylum seekers coming to the UK by sending legitimate refugees to Rwanda.

On EU membership, the BNP and UKIP were the only voices in 2001 advocating for British withdrawal from the EU. Mainstream parties were relatively unified in their support for maintaining a balanced relationship with Europe. However, the 2016 Brexit Referendum radically altered the political landscape. The BNP's erstwhile fringe stance on EU membership now found support in mainstream political discourse, with parties rallying around varying degrees of supporting Brexit.

The themes of national identity and sovereignty, which were strenuously emphasised by the BNP, gradually permeated mainstream political dialogues, especially in debates over immigration and EU membership. In 2001, the BNP's legally illiterate version of sovereignty was considered laughable and extreme, but by 2016 it had been adopted by most Brexiters.

The consequences of the Tories' shift were profound. In 2017, 57% of former UKIP-voters switched to the Conservatives. This demonstrates how the British electoral mainstream, including both its parties and voters, has been radicalised by the far-right rhetoric of Nick Griffin and Nigel Farage.

The ideas of the far-right, sensational as they were, were greedily amplified by the British press. In doing so, they activated racist and xenophobic stereotypes by presenting immigrants and minorities as threats. The press fostered the association of Muslims with terrorism and immigrants and ethnic minorities with crime. These conditions not only made the rhetoric of the far-right seem more reasonable, but also created a desire for policies that would counter these dangerous threats. In short, the British Press made the British population more racist, more xenophobic, more Islamophobic and less tolerant by giving platforms to bigots and demonising minorities, and the British political class rushed to meet the demand for prejudiced policies.

While racist attitudes remain common in the UK, racism as an ideology remains highly stigmatised. By presenting out-groups as being undesirable on the basis of culture, religion, language or nationality, media and political figures provide alternative rationales for derogating those seen as alien to British culture. This rhetorical sleight of hand has made far-right politics mainstream.So long as they hide their racist ideologies behind concerns about culture, religion, language and nationality, they are permitted to participate in the national conversation as equals.

Anti-Alien Attitudes Today

In an era where the lines between political rhetoric and conspiracy theories have dangerously blurred, the infiltration of far-right ideologies into mainstream British politics has become a stark reflection of deeper societal shifts. A study published by the Policy Institute at King’s College London in April 2023 revealed a startling statistic: one in three British adults now subscribes to the Great Replacement conspiracy theory. Propagated by French writer Renaud Camus, this theory alleges a covert agenda to replace white Europeans and Americans with non-white immigrants.

This alarming trend was underscored in the same month by Home Secretary Suella Braverman, who made a dangerously misleading claim on Sky News, asserting that grooming gang members are “almost all British-Pakistani.” Shortly thereafter, Braverman appeared at the National Conservatism conference alongside Tory stalwarts such as Michael Gove, Jacob Rees-Mogg, and David Frost. The event also featured American Senator JD Vance, a known promoter of the Great Replacement conspiracy theory, signaling the mainstream acceptance of previously fringe ideologies within mainstream conservative circles.

Fast forward to September 2023, and Braverman was seen across the pond at a conservative gathering in the US. There, she denounced multiculturalism as a failed endeavour, attributing its downfall to the failure of immigrants to integrate. This sentiment was echoed in October at the Conservative Party Conference, where Braverman’s address bore eerie similarities to Enoch Powell’s notorious “rivers of blood” speech. Like Powell, Braverman issued a dire warning about a “hurricane” of immigrants threatening to engulf Britain, evoking a reaction that propelled her to be noted as one of the conference’s standout speakers.

However, the spotlight soon shifted to Nigel Farage, who dazzled the audience in a unique spectacle alongside former Home Secretary, Priti Patel. Their duet to Frankie Valli’s ‘Can’t Take My Eyes Off You’ added a layer of intrigue to the political discourse of the day. The call for Farage’s return to the Tory political fold was stated most bluntly by Lichfield MP Michael Fabricant on GB News. ‘I strongly believe we should ask Farage to rejoin, and honour him with a knighthood that has been long overdue’.

Tim Montgomerie, a former advisor to Tory leaders and a seasoned conservative commentator, reminisced on Twitter about the warm reception Farage received at the conference. ‘The reception was notable. I believe the party members would choose him as their leader if they could,’ he remarked.

Amidst the whirlwind of events, Prime Minister Sunak shared his take with GB News regarding Farage’s possible re-entry into the party, describing the Conservative party as a “very broad church.” “We welcome anyone who aligns with our ideals and values,” he said. Farage, the man who had started off his career associating with fascist bombers and conspiracy theorists and who had never changed his views, was now sufficiently mainstream to join the Conservatives.

The change marked by Farage’s celebrated presence was not lost on observers. Lewis Goodall from Global’s ‘The News Agents’ podcast encapsulated the essence of the conference, remarking, “You could have been at a UKIP or Brexit Party conference.”

Farage resisted the calls to join the Tory Party. In 2024, he assumed leadership of the Reform Party, focusing almost entirely on immigration to appeal to disaffected Tory voters. Consequently, he experienced his greatest electoral success to date. Reform UK won five seats in the House of Commons, and attracted a 14.3% share of the vote. By comparison, the Tory party received just 21% of the vote and the Labour party received 34%.

Farage personally overturned a Tory majority of more than 25,000 to comfortably win in his Clacton constituency in spite of consistent stories about his candidates praising Hitler, being fans of British fascists, blaming Jews for Muslim immigration, suggesting that Africans have lower intelligence, denying climate change and linking LGBT people to paedophilia.

At the time of writing, betting odds place Farage at 6/1 to take over from Rishi Sunak, reflecting a significant shift from earlier odds of 25/1. However, even if Farage does not emerge as the new Tory leader, the UK has changed so dramatically over the past 20 years, that it is possible, if not probable that another extreme candidate will assume leadership. Provided they survive the impending culling, someone like Suella Braverman, or another candidate who endorses conspiracy theories and far-right policies on immigration, may lead the Tories into the next election.

Conclusion

The historical entanglements of the UK with far-right ideologies extend into modern-day expressions of xenophobia, racism, and sectarianism. From the campaigns against Irish immigrants in the nineteen thirties to the endorsement of slogans like "Keep England White" in the nineteen fifties, to contemporary instances of Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments expressed by right-wing politicians, the far-right narrative has found a persistent voice in the UK's political and social discourse. As noted earlier, prejudice is an effective business model.

The modern rise of far-right organisations and the increasing incidence of far-right terrorist attacks in the UK underscore the persistent allure of extremist ideologies in times of social and political upheaval. The complex interplay of historical legacies, socio-political contexts, and individual and collective psychological biases fosters a conducive environment for the growth and sustenance of far-right ideologies. Addressing the root causes of extremism involves challenging prejudiced media narratives, tackling conspiracy theories, and promoting social cohesion and inclusivity.

If you did not find this episode chilling, then you were probably not paying attention. The transformation of the UK's national conversation and the increased social acceptability of conspiracy theories, bigotry, and discrimination has been nothing short of dramatic. We have seen how far-right arguments that were unacceptable 20 years ago, now dressed up in cheap tuxedos, are gaining popularity and the far-right is taking over the most popular mainstream right-wing party in the UK.

With tough times and difficult decisions ahead for the new Labour government, it is not implausible that by 2029, the UK may be led by a far-right government. Avoiding that outcome will require journalists, politicians, and the public to not repeat the mistakes of the past 20 years and to finally counter the arguments of the far-right. A collective effort is necessary to uphold democratic values and ensure that tolerance, inclusivity, and factual discourse prevail over the divisive rhetoric that has gained ground. Whether there is a will to engage in this effort remains to be seen.